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Summary 
This thesis investigates the behaviour of employees captured by centralised wage-
negotiations. It is empirically shown that centralised institutions are correlated with 
compressed wages, which in turn accumulates several types of conflicts. A centralised 
unions’ association face similar conflicts of interest as within a plant union. The employees 
of different skills and crafts have distinct demands towards the employer, representing their 
importance for the final product. Within this bargaining, no person or group can raise 
specific demands without creating some sort of externality onto the other employees.   
 Compressed wages lead to higher wages for the least productive employees and lower 
wages for the most productive employees. This in turn makes the employers demanding the 
latter better off, as the wage bill becomes lower with compressed wages. With centralisation 
a potential conflict arises within the employers’ confederation; between the skilled labour 
employers and the low-skilled labour employers, demanding the distribution of productivity 
among the labour. 
By letting the wages in a society be based on norms, I implement the described conflicts into 
a game-theoretic approach, similar to the Battle of the Sexes. In a game between a more than 
average productive employee and an employer demanding this specific labour, both players 
need to coordinate on a wage-contract. As the employee receives a lower wage with a 
centralised wage-contract, the employee would prefer if they coordinated on a decentralised 
contract. However, the employer has opposite preferences. He/she has a lower wage-bill in 
the centralised case and prefers on coordinating on a centralised wage-contract. If they 
cannot coordinate, they receive nothing. One may argue that the productive employee carries 
an opportunity cost. This cost is similar to what he/she would have made in a decentralised 
system, with negligible compression of wages. The game is played many times. The 
probability of the other player playing a specific contract is based on information the players 
gather through previously played stage-games, games with other players, word-of-mouth or 
other sources of information. By using this information both players calculate their best 
response strategy. If all employers are expected to play the strategy of centralised wage-
contract, the employee’s best response strategy becomes to coordinate. When the players are 
expected to coordinate on this specific contract, and the expectations become self-enforcing, 
the strategy becomes a convention. This suggests that the most productive employees 
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voluntarily participate in the centralised wage-bargaining, due to their best-response 
strategy.  
If the opportunity-cost change, the expectations of the players change. This could be caused 
by movements in the economic environment, such as economic depression, booms, high 
level of industrial conflict etc. This may modify the players’ best responses and the system 
may flip towards a decentralised wage-contract bargaining. Considering individuals being 
able to make random behavioural mistakes, some players will play non-best-responses. This 
theory suggests that only a few players not able to coordinate on the expected strategy may 
switch expectations from one convention to the other. An increase in the opportunity cost 
associated will impose enhanced pressure on the “satisfied” groups. In the centralised 
system, this implies the high-technological employers and the least productive employees. 
The convention becomes more accessible and tolerates fewer non-best responses. These non-
best responses can be either stochastic or intentional. When the model is stochastic, the 
convention flips by the satisfied players playing “wrong”. This may seem unlikely. When the 
satisfied groups are able to coordinate, the system can only change through intentional non-
best responses by the most dissatisfied groups.        
Equipped with this theory and the historical background of the Nordic countries, this thesis 
provides an explanation of the implementation of the centralised system in these countries. 
Further, this thesis discusses forthcoming difficulties in sustaining these institutions. First is 
the role of migration. Because of free trade-agreements of services within Europe, migrants 
are faced with fewer problems of moving across the borders. This may alter the contextual 
best responses by either the most productive employees or the least productive employers. 
Second is a change of equality preferences within the unions’ association. When unions 
accelerate their sense of actuarial fairness the system may be altered through intentional 
collective actions. However, by using theory of collective action, I find that the centralised 
system may persist, rather than imposing a conventional flip of best-response play. This is 
because the preference shock may not lead to collective action, but rather alter the 
distribution of power among the unions participating in the unions’ association.  
It has been argued by labour economists that the Nordic or Scandinavian model has been 
evolutionary rather than coerced politically. This thesis adds weight to the argument using 
models of evolutionary change through game-theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Few theorists have investigated if and why the most productive labour voluntarily 
participates in centralised wage negotiations. An explanation often assumed is that 
employees in societies with centralised institutions have altruistic traits, are strongly 
inequality averse or have other egalitarian preferences. This thesis treats this subject as 
individual choices in a game theoretic approach.  
There are a variety of systems of collective bargaining with a varying degree of 
centralisation. It has been widely agreed by labour economists that centralised wage 
negotiations compress wage-distribution in a society (Barth and Moene, 2008, Flanagan, 
1999, Cahuc and Zylberberg for summary, 2004). That is, less productive employees tend to 
receive higher wages than their marginal product of labour. Conversely, at the other side of 
the productivity distribution, the most productive employees obtain less than their marginal 
product of labour.  
Compressed wages clearly magnifies conflicts between the most productive employees and 
the least productive. However, equally important are the conflicts arising on the employers’ 
side of the negotiations. A high-technology company demanding productive and educated 
employees will possibly benefit from compressed wages, as their wage-cost becomes less 
than the marginal product of labour. Conversely, the low-technology companies face higher 
wages. These conflicts are described further in chapter 2 which provides a survey of the 
literature on economic theory of collective bargaining.  
The unions’ associations in the Nordic countries have bargained wages according to 
solidarity preferences utilising the slogan equal pay for equal work. This can be assumed to 
be some sort of inequality aversion within the centralised unions’ association. This will be 
further explained in chapter 3.  
By converging the bargaining situation into a 2X2 Battle of the Sexes game representing a 
range of possible wage-contracts, it is possible to explain employees participating in 
centralised wage-negotiations as a best-response strategy. This is possible by letting wage 
setting be based on norms. By the theory provided by P. Young (1996, 1998a, 1998b) on 
conventions and stochastic stable equilibria, playing centralised by the productive 
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employees and employers respectively becomes a convention. Chapter 4 introduces the basic 
setup using game theory and introduction of social norms, while chapter 5 provides the 
model used to analyse the problem.  
However, as the system may persist due to coordination between employers benefitting from 
the system, Chapter 7 provides models of intentional play by the productive employees. The 
purpose of this is to investigate the opportunities a productive employee has to alter the 
system in a preferable way.  
Chapters 6 and 8 discuss how the models presented may be able to analyse how the 
institutions affect the participants’ behaviour. Further they provide some obstacles the 
centralised institutions face in an increasingly globalised environment. As information 
technology advances and free-trade agreements are imposed, the best-response play of the 
players may be altered. Rather than coercion, this thesis emphasizes the willingness of the 
players to act in certain ways for institutional change. This change can eventually be 
explained as being evolutional. Chapter 9 gives some concluding remarks in this respect.   
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2. Literature review 
This section describes the different conflicts of interest that arise in collective agreements. 
From the presentation of economic literature, it is the aim of this section to explain how the 
separate outcomes will act upon the workers’ wages and employers’ profits.  
The first section describes the union objective function, and how multiple preferences may 
alter the wage-bargaining. The second section will depict different dimensions of collective 
agreements and evaluate the potential conflicts of interest within the union(s) and employers, 
respectively. The third section presents discussions on macroeconomic performance in the 
dimensions of wage-bargaining and introduces the hump curve. The fourth section discusses 
the particular conflicts between employees and employers in terms of labour productivity 
and the role of technology. 
2.1 Union Objective in Economic Theory 
In the simplified Right to Manage- model presented in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, chapter 
7) the bargaining is situated between a single union and a single employer. The objective of 
the unions is to maximise the wages of their members and they are given some power in the 
negotiation, which can be regarded as the union’s discount rate. That is, the more impatient 
the union is towards the employer, denoted by a higher discount rate, the weaker it makes 
their bargaining strength. The employer is given some monopoly power and demand labour 
to maximise profits. After implementing the objectives of the different parties in a Nash-
bargaining setup, two critical issues need to be raised. First, the agreement of the wages is 
not pareto-efficient. For a given profit of the firm, the union utility could have increased by 
lowering the wages, and hereby increasing employment. However, since the union objective 
is to maximise wage according to their bargaining power, they will not reach such an 
efficient agreement. Second, a stronger union implies larger wages of members, however, it 
also implies fewer labourers employed. This is a reasonable prediction since the firm 
maximises profits such that the marginal revenue equals the marginal costs. Equation (2.1) 
depicts the Nash-bargaining setup. (U1, Π1) express the utility outcome of the union and 
profits of the firm subsequent to an agreement, (u0, π0) is the fall back position if the 
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negotiation fails. Ω is the bargaining power of the union. ri denotes the discount rate of the 
different parties.  
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Efficiency is easily addressed if the objective function of the union is altered such that they 
maximise utility over both wages and employment. For a given profit-maximising firm with 
a given demand-for-labour curve, the union bargains over both wage and employment so 
that the firm are indifferent between the two outcomes. In doing so, the labour union 
moderate wages weighted against employment. Other than wage and employment, union 
preferences might be on a society level; political power, stability, megalomania, or collective 
coverage of agreements made with the employer. However, it may also be on more personal 
and individual arrangements; company car, kindergarten accessibility, or health-and pension 
insurance. The importance of these preferences will affect the wage-level agreed upon by the 
parties.  
2.2 Potential conflicts within the union and their effect on 
the wage-distribution.  
2.2.1 Dimensions of Collective Agreements 
Across the world, several different systems of wage negotiations have evolved and persisted. 
In some countries workers have organised rather strong unions with many members and in 
other countries union members are almost no-existent. Equally important is the collective 
coverage of the unions’ agreements with a company or employer confederation. Union 
density equals the proportion of wage-earners who are unionised and collective coverage is 
proportion of wage earners who are covered by collective agreements (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004). These two measures can be implemented into a degree of centralisation 
of wage negotiations. Along with employment laws, this may help explain the differences of 
bargaining institutions across countries. Moene et al. (1993) describes two different 
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dimensions of wage-bargaining, depicted in Table 2.1. The first dimension depicts the level 
of the negotiations; plant, industry or nation. The second dimension is whether workers of 
different positions bargain jointly or separately.   
Levels of wage-
setting 
Each Type bargains 
separately All Types bargain jointly 
   
Plant Complete decentralisation (i) Company unions (ii) 
Industry Craft Unions (iii) Industrial Unions  (iv) 
Nation   Complete Centralisation (v) 
Table 2.1 equivalent to Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel (1993) Table 11.2 
(i) Complete decentralisation: the company and the employee negotiate the wage 
independently. Without considering the consequences of others employed, an 
employee may raise wage-demands towards the employer. If she succeeds, the 
overall cost to the employer is increased. For the employer to be indifferent ex 
post, other employees may suffer from cut-backs. There are no collective 
coverage and the employees need to unionise to participate in collective 
negotiations.   
(ii) Company union: the workers of a company unionise and announce wage 
demands towards the company. There exists a conflict of interest in the hierarchy 
of the company. The conflict arises from the power and skills among the 
employed. An employee or a group of employees cannot raise wage-demands 
without considering the total employment. The members of the union need to sort 
out how big a share the different employees of respective skills and value shall 
receive after a negotiation.  
(iii) Craft unions: the workers of a craft are represented by a single union which 
bargains the wage towards the many employers demanding this specific craft. 
The craft union does not have any incentive to moderate wages as they only care 
about their members. In other words, craft unions experience little internal 
conflict of interest, because it is the preference of all members to raise wages. If a 
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society relies on a system where all crafts are unionised separately, it is 
reasonable to predict a wage and price spiral. 
(iv) Industry unions: the workers in an industry unionise and the union represents the 
industry as a whole. Similar to craft unions, the workers in the industry have a 
certain power towards the employer(s). However, since the union is comprised by 
different crafts, an internal conflict within the unions may exist in developing the 
different demands.  
(v) The complete centralised system of wage-negotiation involves all the different 
workers in the different industries represented by a union confederation.  In this 
system there are two stages of conflict. First, the workers across crafts, industries, 
skills and productivity need to resolve the internal arguments of pay-differentials 
within the union association. Second is the actual conflict with the employers. 
The complete centralisation system is found basically in the Nordic countries 
today.  
In case (v), both the union density and the collective coverage are great. One may reason that 
this is the only possible centralised institutional system, however, in many countries the 
bargaining within a specific industry or plant may act as guidelines for local bargaining in 
other sectors. In this sense, the union density may be small, while the collective coverage is 
substantial. This will also be a form of centralised institutions. How to classify the 
bargaining system has long been discussed in labour economic literature (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004, Flanagan, 1999, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).   
2.2.2 A model of union behaviour 
The following paragraph follows Moene et al. (1993) in describing the economic 
mechanisms and union behaviour of the different systems. The model is based on the Right 
to Manage model described in equation (2.1). Union objectives are to maximise utility of 
real wages and level of employment. The latter is determined by the employer. The unions 
are considered to have monopoly power over the negotiation (Ω = 1). For a single union the 
utility is given by 
(2.2)     ))(,( wLwuu =   
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Moene et al (1993) extends the model to include more than one single union. The employees 
with different skills announce wage-demands presented to the employer. However, a 
potential wage increase in one union may generate externalities on another, either positive or 
negative. The sign of these externalities are subject to whether the workers are what Moene 
et al terms substitutes in production or complements in production.  
With complements in production Moene et al (1993) refer to a situation where wage increase 
in one union would decrease the demand for labour in another. The presence of one type of 
job will increase the productivity of the other, when both are needed for the final product. 
Substitutes in production are referred to when the different employees within the same craft 
or with similar skills are represented by different unions. If one union potentially demands 
higher wages, the company could easily lay off all members of this union and hire 
employees with membership in a competing union.  
When unions coordinate towards more centralisation, they internalise these externalities 
created by the wage demands of different workers or crafts. This internalisation 
demonstrates the conflicts of interest within a company union, an industry union or a 
national centralised system, as described in Table 2.1. Thus, if wages was set to maximise 
some sort of collective welfare function, the optimal collective choice is given by 
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The first order condition describes a similar situation as in equation (2.3). However, the last 
term expresses the internalisation of a wage demand on other labourers. If a wage increase 
raises employment in other unions they are said to be substitutes in production, 
i
j
w
L
∂
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>0. If 
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the wage increase lowers employment in other companies’ unions’, the members are 
complements in production, 
i
j
w
L
∂
∂
<0.  
Equations (2.2) to (2.5) explain differences between a decentralised company union case, a 
craft or industry union system and a fully centralised one. If unions are substitutes in 
production they will gain benefits of coordination from company unions to industry unions, 
as they will be able to raise wage demands. The reason is that the industry unions’ 
association does not have to worry about competition from other unions. In other words, the 
power of a potential strike is more credible and will affect all employers. Moene et al call 
this a vertical coordination from plant to industrial unions (see Table 2.1).  In contrast, 
when the union members are complements in production a wage increase by one union will 
have a negative impact on the others. By internalising this externality, no members or unions 
can demand a greater wage without solving the conflict with the other members/unions. This 
reflects a vertical shift in Table 2.1from industrial unions to national coordination. It can 
also explain a horizontal coordination shift from complete decentralisation to plant unions or 
craft unions to industry unions. In this respect, a plant union will face similar conflicts of 
interest as the aggregate national level will.  
2.3 Macroeconomic Performance and Bargaining 
Coordination 
2.3.1 Union Behaviour with Endogenous Prices 
By extending the model above to include endogenous prices, the new union objective is to 
maximise the real wage of its members. In other words, if the union can increase wages, but 
not increase the overall prices reflected in the consumer price index, its members will have 
increased utility. The objective function is given by 
(2.6)     ))(,(
p
wL
p
wuu c=  
w represents bargained wage, pc the consumer price index, and p represents the price of the 
product the firm produces respectively. The consumer price index is implicit depending on 
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both prices of the product price p, and prices on all other goods p*. Because wages in a 
company may provide externalities on other companies, the prices are again implicit 
functions of the wages in the respective company w, and the wage of other companies w*. 
This is summarised in equations (2.7).  
(2.7)        
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By differentiating equation (2.6) with respect to w, having in mind (2.7), the FOC gives 
information on how much a wage increase will impact the product-price of a respective 
product and the impact on the consumer-price index. If the union’s wage-increase, in one 
company or sector, exercises a raise of the product-price in a manner that the relative wage 
is not affected, the layoffs will be marginal. If the weight of the product-price on the 
consumer-price index is small, the relative wage of the workers has increased substantially 
against consumption.    
(2.8)     0)(': 21 =+=∂
∂
p
wLhuu
w
uFOC ,  
h represents to what degree a wage increase will affect the product-price, the price of other 
companies and subsequently the consumer-price index. Notice, if h = 1, equation (2.8) 
becomes similar to equation (2.3). The union has to moderate wage-demands in order to 
maintain employment level. However, if h < 1, the union may increase utility by raising 
wages, since the impact on the level of employment is smaller than the benchmark case of 
equation (2.3). 
In order to investigate the macroeconomic performance on employment, equation (2.8) 
needs further attention. h is given by equation (2.9) and (2.10). 
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The elasticity η measures how much the price of the product will increase subsequent of a 
wage increase in the respective company, while η* says how much prices of the other 
products increase after the wage increase. θ measures the effect of a price increase on the 
consumer price index.  
Consider a union with high η and low η*. From (2.9) and (2.10), this union may increase 
wages drastically. The high η tells that the company “bakes” the increased wages into the 
price of the product, while the low η* makes sure the increased wages will not affect other 
prices. Accompanied with a small θ, the union has managed to increase real wages and 
utility of members. From equation (2.8) and (2.9) this is shown by a small h. The behaviour 
of the union depends on the negative impact of increased wages on employment. 
2.3.2 Level of coordination on union behaviour 
If negotiations are set at plant level, the firms are considered strictly as price takers. This 
implies that θ = 0. That is, the product-price does not affect the consumer price index. Thus, 
the unions observe prices as independent of its own wage, hence η = η*= 0. Implementing 
these into (2.9) one gets h=1. By this reasoning, in the decentralised system, no union will 
aggressively raise wages if level of employment of their members is undertaken.  
At the other extreme, in the national system, the prices set by the employer confederation 
equals the consumer price index. Thus, when p=pc, θ = 1 it follows that h =1. The 
internalisation of externalities within the confederation forces the unions to moderate wages 
to keep employment at a steady level. Similar conflicts arise in the national system as within 
a specific plant union. 
At the intermediate level of coordination, craft- or industrial unions will have lesser 
incentive to moderate wage demands. This is explained in the following way; picture that all 
workers within a particular craft have organised a craft union. Depending on the importance 
and utilisation of the craft, the wages set by the union will have some positive impact on the 
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product-prices. The craft may operate within many industries or only within a particular 
industry. Anyway, if the product-prices of a single industry increase, this will have an 
impact both directly and indirectly on the consumer price index. Hence, a wage increase for 
an entire craft results in η > η*> 0 and )1,0(∈θ . Similar reasoning can be used for industrial 
unions; however, they may face some internal conflict between crafts before announcing 
wage demands. Though, the larger the η and the smaller the θ, the more militant the union 
may behave due to decreased h. In other words, the union is able to transport the added cost 
of increased wages onto “everybody else” through the consumer price index.  
2.3.3 Macroeconomic Performance and the Hump-Curve 
If all workers where either organised in craft- or industrial unions, comparing the latter 
system with the two above, depicts a wage- and price-spiral. The relationship between 
degree of coordination and unemployment performance has been thoroughly researched in 
economic literature (Summarised in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, Flanagan, 1999) Calmfors 
and Drifill (1988, quoted in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004) describes a hump-shaped relation 
between the degree of centralisation of bargaining and the unemployment rate (u). 
  
Figure 2.1  Source Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) 
Degree of centralistion of bargaining 
Flanagan (1999) outlines two attacks against this hump-shaped hypothesis of 
macroeconomic performance. The first objection of the argument regards the assumptions of 
a closed economy and complete bargaining coverage. Flanagan (1999) argues: “To the 
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extent that foreign goods are substitutes, it will become difficult for domestic firms to pass 
on pay increases to the consumers, (…) [And] industry-wide bargaining units to pass on 
wage into prices. The higher risk of employment loss in the face of international competition 
should also mitigate union wage demands.” The second objection is the argument of the 
relationship between the level of collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance. 
The flexibility does not rely on bargaining coordination as a centralised institution, but 
rather on the degree of coverage of the outcome. An example of a high degree of coverage is 
the spring-offensive (Shunto) in Japan, where company level bargaining in some 
representative companies act as guidelines for other bargaining units.  Flanagan summarises 
the empirical work made in the 1990s, predicting that any relationship between bargaining 
structure and macroeconomic outcome is contingent on the particular economic or political 
environment of a country and the technical relationship between different groups of 
unionised employees.  
Conversely of Flanagan’s critique of centralisation and openness, the Nordic countries have 
a relatively high degree of centralisation and are both open and specialised economies. 
However, the relationship between centralised bargaining and specific features of the 
“Scandinavian” welfare state may act complimentary with the wage-system. These features 
include: generous and universal unemployment benefits, health- and pension insurance and 
child support and the unions’ effort to implementing “equal pay for equal work” together 
with a full employment policy. Calmfors (1982, quoted in Flanagan) describes the 
governments (usually left-of-centre) behaviour when employment falls below a specific 
target.  To offset the employment disturbances, the government appeals to labour 
constituencies by increasing public employment. Flanagan (1999) argues that the active role 
of the government in accommodation policies lowers the elasticity of demand facing a 
centralised union, inducing a higher real wage in equilibrium. The specific features of the 
Scandinavian countries may therefore result in the opposite of the rationale described above, 
that centralisation creates lower real wages. However, the public employment is guarded by 
the centralised wage-negotiation. This may make it easier for the government to raise public 
employment in the first place. The equality preference within the central unions’ association 
will compress the wages respectively. The mean wage-earner will face a higher real wage, 
while the top wage-earner will make a lower real wage.   
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2.4 Labour Productivity and Wage compression 
2.4.1 The wage equalising effect 
An article by Barth and Moene (2008) provides empirical findings of both an equality 
magnifying effect and a wage equalising effect. The first mechanism: “runs from the wage 
distribution to the determination of welfare state policies:  More wage equality leads the 
majority of voters to support a more generous welfare state. The other mechanism runs from 
welfare state policies to wage determination: More generous welfare benefits reduce wage 
inequality by strengthening weak groups in the labour market.” The latter argument is even 
stronger with a higher level of coordination in wage-negotiations. Barth and Moene (2008) 
argue: “A drop in the coordination, (…) from full coordination to full decentralisation, 
increases wage inequality by 12 percent.” This, they claim, will give negative feedback for 
welfare generosity which again decreases wage inequality though the equality multiplier. 
This expresses two important features. First, there is a direct positive relationship between 
wage-coordination and compression of wages. In other words, when wages are bargained 
between a union confederation and an employers association, the least productive employees 
tend to get increased wages, while the most productive employees tend to get decreased 
wages. Second, wages will indirectly be further compressed through welfare generosity in a 
multiplier. These features are not compatible with standard economic theory of incentives as 
the workers are not paid in line with their marginal productivity of labour. This raises the 
question if the most productive labourers would freely join the wage coordination, as this 
would lower their wages.  
The model by Barth and Moene (2008) illustrates the argument of wage-compression 
between productive labour and less productive labour. They regard the wage-coordination 
process in two stages. The first stage is the negotiation between the unions’ association and 
the employer confederation. The model used is a Nash-bargaining similar to the one 
presented in equation (2.1). The fall-back positions (u0 and π0 in (2.1)) are regarded as the 
outcomes of wages and profits in a decentralised system, times a loss of value due to labour 
disputes in case of breakdown. This is a measure of δ<1. The next stage is the internal 
negotiations within the unions’ association. In a decentralised system all unions have equal 
strength towards the employer, however, in the union-union negotiation a concern is raised 
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for equal treatment,  in addition to rewards according to labour productivity, p. If 
w(p) represents some wage received in a decentralised system depending on the individual’s 
productivity, let W(p) be the wage obtained in a centralised system. 
)1,0(∈r
(2.11)     [ ]pprpwpW −−+= ˆ)1()()( αδ ,  
In equation (2.11), α is the bargaining power of the unions’ confederation in the first stage 
(equivalent to Ω in equation (2.1)), and  is average labour productivity. Depending on the 
concern for equal treatment in the internal conflict, equation (2.11) implies that an individual 
with lower labour productivity than the average worker will benefit from higher wages in the 
centralised system. However, a more productive worker will pick up a cost in the centralised 
system, induced by lower wage. This can be regarded as an opportunity cost carried by an 
above average productive employee in a centralised wage-bargaining system.  
pˆ
Barth and Moene (2008) found a significant relationship between wage-coordination and 
compression of wages. Table 2.2depicts wage inequality in the OECD countries represented 
by the ninth deciles of wage earners divided by first deciles. Table 2.3 shows the wage 
distribution between the top wage-earners divided by the median wage-earners.  
 
Table 2.2 
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Table 2.3 Source OECD Earnings Database  
In Norway the highest wage-earners make 2.21 times more than the ten percent with the 
lowest wages and in Denmark 2.64 times more. The difference in wage equality towards the 
Anglo-American countries is striking. In US the highest wage-earners make 4.86 times more 
the lowest wage-earners and in UK they make 3.62 times more. The continental European 
countries are somewhat in-between with France and the Netherlands with 2.91and Germany 
at 3.26. The wages earned by the ninth deciles divided by the median wage are much lower 
in countries with higher degree of centralised wage bargaining. In the Nordic countries, 
along with Germany, the highest wage earners make 1.5 to 1.7 times more than the 
subsequent median wage earner. In the Anglo-American countries and in continental Europe 
the difference is much greater. 
Equation (2.11) describes an important characteristic often used by critics of union presence. 
Progressively lower wages to productivity will give less incentive for people to gain 
productivity by education or other kinds of experience. Further, the employers will not be 
able to raise wages in order to attract the most productive labourers, since they too are bound 
by the wage-negotiation. So far this thesis has focused mainly on the employees and their 
preferences measured through union utility. However, the employers’ bargaining preferences 
may be as important as the workers’.  
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2.4.2 Employer participation and the role of technology 
Arguably, in a country with high degree of centralisation, the various employers experience 
similar internal conflicts within the employers’ confederation as unions within the unions’ 
association. Employers of different production, craft utilisation, industry and technology will 
have a range of demands towards each other and against the unions.  
The process involves another important feature to be discussed. Are the employers forced 
into the system of centralised wage bargaining, or do they participate voluntarily? It is fairly 
reasonable to believe that employers of the most productive labourers actually benefit from 
the progressive wage-restraint carried by their employees respectively. In other words, high-
technology industries or companies, which demand a significant share of the most 
productive workers in the distribution of productivity, will achieve lower wage-costs in the 
centralised system. A potential conflict within the confederation is between low-productivity 
companies and high-productivity companies.  
Rueda and Pontusson (2000) describes that from the demand side, “labour economists 
typically argue that growth of wage inequality in the US, and elsewhere, reflects 
technological changes, which have rendered more educated workers more valuable to 
employers than less educated workers.” Further, they explain with regard to the supply side, 
“(…) the compression of wage differentials prior to the 1970s coincided with rapid growth 
of university enrolments, that is, with an increase in the relative supply of educated labour. 
As the growth of university enrolments decelerated, the supply of better-educated labour 
subsequently failed to keep up with demand, giving rise to sharply increasing returns to 
education.” Hence, as technology advances, more employers demands skilled labour to cope 
with new technology. In a centralised system these employers may then benefit from the 
compression of wages. Swenson (1991a) suggests that “centralised unions and the Left 
exercise institutionalised power in advanced industrial societies not against or in any way at 
the expense of employers.” This is also the reasoning in an article by Moene and Wallerstein 
from 2006 called “Social Democracy as a Development Strategy”. They explain that in the 
development of the Nordic countries the government, or The Social Democrats, saw the 
primary obstacle to modernisation as strong local unions whose wage premiums restricted 
the expansion of the most productive sectors. “By reducing profits in low-productivity firms 
and increasing profits in high-productivity firms, labour and capital would be induced (or 
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coerced) to move from low productive to highly productive activities, increasing aggregate 
efficiency as well as improving equality” (Agell and Lommerud 1993, quoted in Moene and 
Wallerstein 2006; Moene and Wallerstein 1997).  
2.4.3 Creative Destruction by Wage Compression 
In a model developed by Moene and Wallerstein (1997) coordinated wages and decreased 
competition for productive employees results in a faster rate of creative destruction. In other 
words, a fully decentralised wage setting “subsidises” low-productive companies by 
unskilled and poor labourers. In the centralised system these companies will carry an extra 
cost equivalent as introducing a tax on these companies. In contrast, the more productive 
employers receive a “tax-relief” inducing more investments in new technology. The above 
description is similar to that of Jones (1987, quoted in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004) and the 
impact of minimum wages. Jones distinguishes between “good jobs” which require people 
who can handle complex tasks, and “bad jobs”, in which they don’t. As Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004) reason: “The workers with the good jobs, whose effort at work can only 
be observed imperfectly, receive an efficiency wage, while the ones with a bad job are paid 
at a lower rate, equal to their reservation wage. When a minimum wage lying somewhere 
between (…) it reduces the efficiency wage and increases the number of good jobs opened 
up. In some circumstances, the increase in the number of good jobs even exceeds the decline 
in the number of bad ones.” In the Nordic countries with centralised bargaining, there is no 
“minimum wage” introduced by politicians, rather the different parties of the wage 
negotiations discuss lower bounds and “predicts that, at company level, the employees are 
given increments” (Stokke and Seip, 2003). Thus, Rueda and Pontusson (2000) describe that 
a supply shock of unskilled labour due to immigrants and the massive increase in women’s 
participation in the labour force pressed the wage for unskilled labour down. This raised 
inequality in most OECD countries; except in countries where union-negotiated wage 
contracts were extended to non-union workers.  
The role of technology and the strength of the different employers in a potential employer-
employer negotiation may therefore be highly important when creating of a centralised wage 
system. If the employers of less productive employees are strong, and there are many, easy 
substitutable, unskilled workers in the workforce; the employers of high-technological firms 
may come out short in a potential internal bargaining. In an open economy, with plentiful 
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access to unskilled and non-unionised labour, this situation would seem reasonable. 
However, the presence of centralised systems is in fact found in small and open economies 
in the north of Europe. Furthermore, coordinated wage may reduce incentives for workers to 
invest in education; however, it may also create more jobs demanding better skilled 
employees. Thus, if education is expensive, one would demand higher wage as 
compensation. The next section summarises the theory discussed so far with a historical 
view from the Nordic countries. 
2.5 Sum of Literature Review- A Historical Context of the 
Nordic countries 
In the 1920s and the early 1930s, Norway and Sweden experienced a substantial degree of 
unemployment, which “was due to the highest level of industrial conflict in the world” 
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2006). The costs of these conflicts were extremely expensive for 
both employees and employers. As Moene and Wallerstein (2006) further reports:  
“In Norway the number of working days lost in strikes and lockouts in one year-
1931- were three times larger than the total number of working days lost in industrial 
conflict over the twenty-five year period 1945-70. (…) Employers were equally 
militant in defending their interests [as workers’ unions]. More working days were 
lost in lockouts than in strikes.”  
One would easily argue that these circumstances pushed the parties of the conflicts to seek 
for new arrangements in order to raise both long-term profits and wages. It has been argued 
by Peter Swenson that, driven by the Great Depression, the rationale for centralisation 
developed as a consensus among the unions. Swenson (1991a) writes:  
“During the depression employers in traded goods were forced to reduce prices to 
maintain production, and unions like the metalworkers accommodated them by 
accepting wage reductions. Their ability to do so was limited by the fact that the 
metalworkers’ militancy could not be contained long if pay differentials across sectors 
were not reduced and kept under control. (...) It could not maintain long-term restraint, 
however, if wages in home-market sectors were not somehow indirectly subjected to 
the same discipline.” 
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The arguments used by Swenson coincide with the theory of Moene et al (1993). 
Competition forced the export-sector to reduce prices, and subsequently wages. To prevent 
their members from relative poverty it was necessary that all other sectors showed restraint 
in their wage-demands to keep prices low. Their biggest obstacle was the union in 
construction and buildings. They were protected from international competition and their 
militancy was immense. Swenson (1991a) attempts to highlight the militant role of the 
employers in fostering union centralisation and argues that Scandinavian employers used 
multisectoral “sympathy” and “offensive” lockouts to promote the centralisation of union 
authority and industrial relations.  
“Employers in SAF (employers’ confederation in Sweden) threatened a sweeping 
economy-wide lockout in response to strikes in the building trades begun in 1933. (…) 
As a consequence of pressure from Social Democrats, Agrarians, SAF and LO (Labour 
Unions’ Association) finally prevailed on the construction union to call off the strikes. 
The confederation stepped in again with even less hesitation in 1937 with a “brutal 
public rebuke” of two of its own construction unions that had called strikes.”   
Flanagan (1999) argues that centralisation was contingent on the political and economic 
environment and stressed the government role in maintaining low levels of unemployment. 
The history of the Scandinavian countries demonstrates not only an active government in 
macroeconomic policies, but also a direct responsibility for the creation of the system in 
itself. This suggests that the government, when left-of-centre, may feel greater consciousness 
for the system and the level of employment. The relationship remains close to this day, and 
LO in Norway are the biggest contributor of funds to the Labour party 
(www.partifinanisering.no, 2007).  
Flanagan (1999) describes the shortages to the hump-shape of centralisation on aggregate 
employment. In particular, he criticise the models of complements in production and 
substitutes of production and degree of the openness of economic activity. However, 
Swenson (1991a) explains that openness is one of the key features of the process of 
centralisation in the Scandinavian countries.  
“For employers in small economies dependent on or vulnerable to international trade, 
problems with regulating pay across home-market and traded-goods sectors were 
probably more acute than they were elsewhere. In large countries employers in traded 
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goods had larger home markets and were therefore better insulated from international 
discipline. They would have been better able to raise prices along with wages to keep 
up with the construction industry.  
Further Swenson claims that employers could coordinate punitive actions towards domestic 
competitors, which is not possible for their counterparts in small and open economies. 
Swenson argues that openness was merely the employers’ bottleneck, rather than the 
substitution between employees. However, he describes the compression of wages with 
differences between Denmark and Sweden. In Sweden the skilled and unskilled 
metalworkers pushed successfully towards interoccupational levelling. In Denmark, the 
skilled metalworkers supported employers’ effort to maintain differentials. Swenson claims 
the Danish Social Democrats intervened against the unskilled general labourers’ union, but 
was allied with the skilled workers’ union. This can be seen as a sort of coercion to bring 
labour from less productive technology towards more productive technology. The unskilled 
craftsmen in construction and metal were a militant but weak union, and the skilled workers 
wanted more control over the outcome of wages. Thus the outcome was somewhat similar, 
but with different histories. This clearly depicts the conflicts of interests both within the 
workers’ unions and in an employer-employer relationship. However, as in Denmark it may 
seem somewhat strange that the skilled labourers wanted more centralisation. Did they know 
they would be less paid than in a decentralised system? Obviously, potential strikes by the 
unskilled could damage their own jobs, so their militancy needed to be weakened. A most 
important feature was the employers’ pressure on centralisation in order to keep the 
unskilled worker unions in control, especially within the building sector. Axel Hadenius 
(quoted in Swenson 1991a) writes that as early as in 1907, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian 
employers met in Copenhagen to discuss cooperation. He claims that one of the few 
substantive resolutions they made regarding wage policies was to keep earnings in the 
building trades roughly in line with earnings in other industries. The benefit of centralisation 
has clearly been witnessed by employers in the Scandinavian countries. However, Moene 
and Wallerstein (2006) verify that employers in highly productive industries lost ability to 
attract workers with offers of higher pay. They write: 
“The government, unions and employers responded to the problem with an array of 
active labour market policies that subsidised the movement of workers from one 
industry to another with training programs and grants to cover moving expenses. To 
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keep highly productive employers from undermining the policy of wage restraint by 
offering workers generous benefits (which were harder than wages to monitor at 
central level), the Swedish employers’ confederation lobbied the government to 
nationalise the provision of health care and pensions (Swenson, 2002).”  
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3. Other Regarding Preferences- Inequality 
Aversion 
So far this thesis has examined economic theory of wage-bargaining and discussed the effect 
of centralised bargaining on employee wages and employer profits. This chapter will explore 
a quite different, but important, subject. The models investigated in the previous chapter 
could have been interpreted differently, along with most economic theory, relaxing the 
assumption of the rational, economic man. In this thesis’ main model of chapter 5, the 
bargaining theory introduced in chapter 2 is crucial. However, the model also needs to be 
equipped with the theory of other regarding preferences.  
Economic theory has treated individuals to be entirely self-interested. However, experiments 
using the ultimatum game (UG) “has been conducted throughout the world with student 
populations and has generated robust violations of the canonical model” (Heinrich et al., 
2001). In the sequential UG a proposer offers a share of a given endowment to the receiver. 
The receiver will then accept or reject. If accepted, both get their agreed shares. If rejected, 
they both receive nothing. The rational self-interested proposer is expected to propose 
marginally nothing to the receiver. The receiver will rationally accept this offer as a best 
response strategy. There exists a Nash Equilibrium where the proposer gets the whole pot, 
while the receiver gets nothing.  
Results of the experiments show that two violations of the canonical model appear. First, the 
receivers often reject offers below a certain level. Second, the proposers offer a substantial 
amount to the receiver. If the latter anticipates the rejection-level, to propose marginally 
above this level is an act of rational income maximisation. However, the behaviour of the 
proposer may be one of inequality aversion or altruism. Inequality aversion suggests that 
people “are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more 
equitable outcomes” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); while altruists get a higher utility of giving 
(see Nyborg and Rege, 2001, for discussions on altruism). The receivers’ violation can be 
considered to be reciprocal in addition to inequality averse. The receiver is willing to take on 
a loss in punishing the proposer for not sharing what she ought to perceive as a fair share. 
This thesis will only discuss inequality aversion in the importance it has for sense of 
equality, measured by r in equation (2.11).  
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Fehr and Schmidt (1999) developed a simple utility-function able to explain the observed 
results. They “model fairness as self-centred inequality aversion. (…) Self-centred if people 
do not care per se about inequality that exists among other people but are only interested in 
the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others” (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999).   
(3.1)      )0,max()0,max( *2
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w* represent the payoff to the other players, or individuals, and w is the payoff to individual 
i. The person is self-centred and receive increased utility in material payoff, however, 
experience a disutility in the relative payoff to the other. If either w* is greater or less than w 
the individual’s utility is decreased. The λ-parameters explain the impact of relative payoff 
on the utility. “The assumption 21 λλ >  captures the idea that a player suffers more from 
inequality that is to his disadvantage” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This, they claim, is backed 
by empirical evidence.   
3.1 Inequality Aversion among Unions- Norms of Fairness? 
The theory of inequality aversion can be implemented into the model of union behaviour as 
described in section 2.2. Moene et al (1993) assume that the unions have monopoly power 
and can decide wages, while the company determines the employment from the demand-for-
labour curve. The union objective function, given by (3.2) is somewhat similar to equation 
(2.2). 
(3.2)      )),(),(,( *wwzwLwuu =
 z is some variable depending on wages elsewhere in the economy, among unions, or within 
an industry, w*, as well as wages in the plant, w. Moene et al (1993) explains: “Suppose, for 
whatever reason, that union members care about how much they are paid relative to other 
workers in addition to the standard concerns with wage levels and employment security.  
Then z can be written *w
wz =  with 0>∂
∂
z
u . (…) If all unions try to increase their wage 
relative to the others, none will change position. Wages will increase, however, and 
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unemployment will rise. (…) Centralised wage-setting reduces wages inhibiting the fruitless 
struggle of each group to raise its wage more than the others” (Moene et al, 1993).  
Even though centralised bargaining may moderate wage-struggle, the utility function of the 
union presented by Moene et al. does not provide any solidarity between the unions. 
However, implementing inequality function (3.1) into z in (3.2), 
 the relative wage of the union directly 
concerns both disutility of less wage and solidarity towards other unions’ wages.  
)0,max()0,max(),( *2
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There are two important matters from this section to be further discussed before introducing 
the theory of this thesis. First; the solidarity between unions within centralised bargaining 
creates more equal and compressed wage distribution. In the wage-equation presented in 
section 2.4 by Barth and Moene (2008) the measure of preferences for equality,  is a 
function of the inequality aversion in a specific union. In addition, Barth and Moene (2008) 
discuss r as increasing in levels of coordination of wage-bargaining. This, they claim, may 
be due to increased pressure on equal treatment as representatives must publicly defend the 
relative wages they have negotiated. Second, fairness norms are important for wage-setting 
in centralised wage-bargaining. Chapters 4 to 8 will treat both these matters more closely in 
trying to explain the centralised system as a norm-based model in a game-theoretic 
approach. 
)1,0(∈r
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4. Wage-bargaining modelled as a norm-based 
coordination game 
The model of chapter 5 presumes that the reader understands the specific theoretic approach. 
Chapter 4 provides the basic setup of the game theory used, and gives a presentation of 
social norms and discusses how norms can be applied in the particular model.   
4.1 The setup: Battle of the Sexes 
Consider a 2X2 normal-form game between two players. The players are named player e and 
player E, and both have two strategies to play {C, D}. The payoffs to each strategy are given 
in Figure 4.1.  
Battle of the sexes 
  Player E 
    Strategy C Strategy D
Player 
e Strategy C W , Π  0 , 0  
  Strategy D 0 , 0 w , π 
Figure 4.1 
The name “Battle of the Sexes” may be somewhat misleading, but stems from a scenario 
where a couple simultaneously decides on going to the cinema or the opera. Both of the 
lovers would like to meet up at the same place, otherwise they won’t bother to enter the 
venue, and their payoffs are both zero. However, if they manage to coordinate, they have 
different preferences. One of the players would like to go to the cinema, while the other 
would like to go the opera. The payoffs in Figure 4.1suggests that, for example, player e 
would prefer a coordination on strategy D rather than on strategy C, i.e. 0<W<w. However, 
player E prefers the opposite coordination with payoffs given by 0< π< Π. The two pure 
Nash-equilibria of this game are strategies {C, C} or {D, D}.  
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By letting both players put probabilities on what strategy the other player will choose, the 
players may select a mix between the two strategies. Consider e putting probability p on E 
choosing {C} and 1-p on E choosing {D}. Then player e’s expected payoff by playing {C} 
is , and the expected payoffs of playing {D} will be . 
For e to be indifferent between the two strategies p must equal: 
0*)1(* pWp −+ wpp *)1(0* −+
(4.1)     
Ww
wp +=      
Similar results for player E letting q being the probability of e playing {C} and 1-q that e 
chooses {D}. The mixed strategy Nash-equilibrium is ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Π+=+= π
πq
Ww
wp ,  . 
If one of the players believes that the other will choose a strategy with a larger probability 
than what is given by the mixed equilibrium, then best response will be to select strategies 
accordingly.  This implementation will be discussed further in the thesis.  
4.2 How to model bargaining situation based on norms?  
This section does not look further into the form of the bargaining, rather that there is a range 
of possible optimal contracts between the two parties, and that they have to agree on one of 
these contracts. The contracts specify the terms and the payoffs to each party. “Here 
convention plays a key role by providing focal points that help the parties resolve the 
indeterminacy of the bargaining situation” (Young, 1998). In this sense, the share an 
employee will receive in a given period depends largely on the share other employees in 
similar firms will receive in the same period (w*). Young (1996, 1998a, 1998b) provides 
examples from the bargaining situation between landlord and tenant in sharecropping 
contracts. It is in this manner this section will treat more general wage-bargaining.   
Recall the two stage approach of bargaining introduced by Barth and Moene (2008) in 
section 2.4. Then consider the distribution of wages agreed in the first two stages will hold 
as pinpoints, for a third stage of negotiating; an internal wage-negotiation between the 
employer and the one employed, or yet to be employed. When both parties sign a binding 
contract, specifying the wage, the terms of the contract will last for one period, usually a 
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year. After one period the terms of the contract will be re-negotiated, and so forth. If the 
parties of the negotiation use the focal points given by the centralised bargainers as 
conventions, may we then describe an employee that voluntary stick to the coordinated wage 
as adhering to social norms? Elster (1989, pp. 102) defines a social norm as a norm that must 
be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval. Obviously, 
it is difficult to address whether approval or disapproval would be given to a person in 
favour of centralised bargaining or not, otherwise in a society carrying a high degree of 
inequality-aversion. However, Elster (1989, pp 102-103) depicts a social norm of fair 
division of surplus between capital and labour in a wage-bargaining situation: “Employers 
will appeal to this norm when the firm does badly, workers when it does well. There is a 
norm of equal pay for equal work. Workers will appeal to this norm when they earn less than 
workers in similar firms, but not when they earn more.”     
The crucial interpretation is that both employers and employees have expectations about 
what the other will demand. Schelling (1960, quoted in Young, 1998a) interprets these 
expectations, or contextual cues, as focal points, “of which cannot be defined a priori; they 
depend on the coordination problem at hand and the culture in which the players are 
embedded” (quoted in Young, 1996). Following the framework of Bowles (2007, ch.12) and 
Young (1996, 1998a, 1998b), the wage-bargaining situation described will take the form of a 
contract game, similar to a Nash demand-game and a modified version of The Battle of the 
Sexes given in Figure 4.1.  
4.2.1 Description of a Nash-Demand game in the generalised 
wage-setting 
Every period a number of employees and a number of employers get to re-negotiate the 
wage in a one-shot game, expressed as a match. Each population consists of k individuals. 
The process evolves in discrete time intervals t = 1, 2, 3…. In a match, each person in each 
matched group names a contract – the proposed terms of their relationship. If both name the 
same contract i, they enter into this contract in period t +1, and receive the expected payoffs 
wi ,πi respectively. “If they name different contracts (i.e. they cannot agree on the terms) they 
are unattached for the period and their payoffs are zero” (Young, 1998a). “The individuals 
are represented as bearers of strategies they have adopted, while the distribution of strategies 
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among them varies” (Bowles, 2007).  The players use this distribution of strategies “to 
predict the likelihood that his current partner will make various demands” (Young 1998a).   
From past experience, job-interviews and by word of mouth etc. both players have partial 
information about the other player. The payoffs depend on who is playing. This suggests that 
the most productive employee may demand a slightly higher share than the least productive 
employee. Since the employer has gathered some information about the other player, and 
formed some expectations about what the employee will demand, the employer will demand 
a share that is slightly lower from the productive employee and a slightly higher share from 
the unproductive. However, both the employer and the employee, both productive and 
unproductive, have gathered some information about what other players, similar to them, 
receive in surrounding demand-games. This suggests then that when playing this one-shot 
game, both players have enough information to form some expectations about what they will 
receive of the share of the surplus, and will reach Nash equilibrium.  
Further, I consider the conflict of interest between highly productive employers and 
employees and their payoffs respectively. In this manner I reasonably assume that if these 
parties cannot overcome the obstacles in the agreement of a contract, and overthrow the 
centralised presumed wage-distributions, the conflict between highly and less productive 
employers (employees) will reach new heights. In this scenario there is no room for the 
employers’ confederation (union association), and it will be destructed. One may argue that 
the centralised bargaining will be attacked from “above”. This may happen if the most 
productive employees are largely dissatisfied. However, the same argument could have been 
used if the less productive employers were largely dissatisfied, and could not come to an 
agreement with the least productive employees. However, in the Nordic countries, the least 
productive employees are guarded by a high unemployment benefit, which makes this 
scenario less likely. Another feature of the unskilled labour, which makes them less 
convenient to use in this setting, is that unskilled and low-paid labour is more substitutable, 
so their bargaining position is more immediate. That is, they have a lower discount rate in 
the wage-bargaining. However, in case of breakdown in either of the contracts-settings, there 
is reason to believe that the new institutional system would move towards decentralised 
wage negotiations. This can be either partial coordination bargaining, i.e. industry- or craft 
wage-bargaining, or full decentralisation.  
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5. The Model 
5.1 The contract game in a generalised bargaining 
situation 
The contract game depicted in Figure 5.1is to be interpreted as follows: Contract C is 
regarded as a benchmark contract of a Centralised wage system, while contract D is the 
alternative of what the employees would have earned in a Decentralised system. If they 
cannot agree the employee will leave the job, while the employer will be left with a vacant 
position. That is, if they cannot match their strategies, both receive a payoff of zero. While 
the employee demands a contract with wages reflecting marginal labour productivity {D}, 
the employer is only willing to pay the employee according to the centralised wage {C}.  
Payoffs in the contract game 
 
Employer offer 
contract C (EC) 
Employer offer 
contract D (ED) 
Employee offer 
contract C (eC) W(p) , Π(p)  0 , 0  
Employee offer 
contract D (eD) 0 , 0 w(p) , π(p) 
Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.1is similar to Figure 4.1, and differs only in that the payoffs are functions of 
productivity. W(p) and w(p) are taken from the bargaining model of Barth and Moene (2008) 
(see section 2.4) , where W(p) is the wage to an employee participating in the centralised 
system, while w(p) is the wage obtained in a decentralised system, or if the centralised 
negotiations breaks down. Π(p) and π(p) represents payoffs to the employer with same 
interpretation as W(p) and w(p).  
From Section 2.4 W(p) is given by 
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(5.1)     )ˆ)(1()()( pprpwpW −−+= δω ,  
pˆ represents average productivity in the society. r is the fairness of equality regarded by the 
unions’ confederation and ω is their bargaining power. 
Equation (5.1) explains that an employee with above average productivity will receive a 
lower wage than in a decentralised system and, conversely, a lower than average productive 
employee will benefit from centralised wage. Profit-functions are similar to that of Barth and 
Moene (2008) given by 
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Combining (5.1) and (5.2) gives )ˆ)(1()()( pprpwpp −−−−=Π δω  
(5.3)     )ˆ)(1()()( pprpp −−+=Π δωπ  
Figure 5.1 depicts the same conflicts as described in section (2.3). The top left corner shows 
that employers demanding highly productive employees would prefer the centralised wage-
bargaining, while employers in need of less productive employees would be better off in the 
decentralised setting. However, the workers have opposite preferences. The productive 
employees would earn more in a decentralised system, while the less than average 
productive employee benefits from the centralisation of wage-negotiations.  
Throughout the thesis I will assume that negotiations are based on productivity p of the 
individuals. That being if wage is bargained collectively, the bargainers will consist of 
individuals with equal productivity. Homogenous union members are obviously a great 
simplification as most trade unions consist of members with differing productivity. I am 
aware of this, but relaxing this assumption would cause difficulties in explaining the basic 
arguments that follows.  
5.1.1 Expected payoffs of the players   
Following Bowles (2007), let α  be the number of employees that played strategy {C} in 
previous period, and β  the number of employers that played {C}. α  andβ  are regarded as 
probabilities that the opposite player in a contract-setting will play {C}. Bowles and Naidu 
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(2008) describe a process of the players being able to revise their strategy.  Each time they 
are matched, agents play the strategy that they played last with probability 1-v or revise their 
strategy with probability v. If they revise and do not alter the strategy, they play the best 
response to last periods’ distribution of strategies. In the following presentation, the level of 
δ is excluded without altering the basic argument.  
(5.4)     Expected payoffs for employee: 
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The best response for each player would be to play the strategy that would maximise the 
expected profit. Thus the chosen strategy would be a function of how many people played 
the different strategies in the previous period. If there are no random shocks in terms of 
idiosyncratic play, {C, C}, or {D, D} would easily become stable conventions, depending on 
the initial state. Young (1996) defines a convention as a pattern of behaviour that is 
customary, expected and self-enforcing. 
Regard the levels  as the numbers of individuals that have to play non-best response 
for the other party to switch their best-response play respectively. These measures are 
similar to that of p and q in equations (4.1) and (4.2).  
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The values of  and  now depends on what kind of players that are matched. Since the 
employer and employee have partial information about the other party, it is reasonable to 
assume that productive employees are being matched with productive employers and vice 
versa. However, as the distribution of payoffs differs, the preferences of the parties will also 
differ. In a match between the productive employer and the productive employee the 
preferences are:
*α
W
*β
) w )()(),(( pppp π>Π< , then 
2
1* <α and
2
1* >β . The probabilities 
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** ,βα  define the best reply-functions of each player. Hence, if , best-reply for the 
employers is to play strategy {C}. If  it will be best-reply for the employees to play 
strategy {C}. See 
*αα >
*ββ >
Figure 5.2 
    
Number of 
employers playing 
β* 
 α* Number of employees 
playing {C} 
Figure 5.2 
Now assume that the players can play idiosyncratic non-best for some reason, whether 
stochastic or intentional. Bowles (2007) explains that if a convention requires a large amount 
of idiosyncratic play to dislodge, while requiring little idiosyncratic play to access, it is a 
robust convention. Consider that the initial state is the benchmark state {C,C}. depicts 
the opportunity cost of what the productive employee would have received as a share of the 
surplus in a decentralised wage negotiation. The larger the opportunity cost, the larger  
will become. Thus, if for any reason some of the employers play non-best responses, the 
number of such responses needed to switch convention to decentralised,  will 
decrease. In other words, the {D} convention of decentralisation becomes more accessible. 
Bowles (2007) defines accessible as a convention that “does not require much bunching of 
nonbest-response play to displace the population state into the basin of attraction of the 
robust convention”. In 
)( pw
)*
*β
1( β−
Figure 5.2, as the unstable and mixed equilibrium moves in the 
north-east direction, the space that attracts people to play the stable, pure equilibrium {D} 
advances. This suggests that as  increase relative to , for the employers to stay in )( pw )( pW
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the preferred state, at least as many, or more, players must play conventional as in the 
previous round.  
If )( pπ  describes how much the employer must redistribute to the employee in a 
decentralised wage negotiation, then )( pΠ becomes relative savings of the employers in the 
benchmark case. Thus, the smaller )( pπ  gets relative to )( pΠ , the smaller  will become. 
This implies that the centralised convention {C, C} will be more persistent, because it will 
now require a larger bunch of idiosyncratic play by the employees to tip the employers best-
response play.   
*α
This is shown by taking the derivative of equations (5.1) and (5.3) with respect to 
productivity p. Keeping the average productivity constant and excluding the dispute factor, 
the derivatives becomes 
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Equations (5.7) show that an increase in individual productivity will increase the relative 
difference in wages between a decentralised wage w(p), and a centralised wage W(p). 
However, the opposite will happen between the relative profits in a centralised and a 
decentralised system. This implies that an individual increase in productivity will alter 
and .  *α *β
5.2 Stochastic Play Introduced- Limit of Memory 
So far the memory of the players has been considered to be all of the matches in the previous 
round. In other words, all the employees and all the employers to be matched in this period 
have information about contracts by the similar firms and workers, by either word-of-mouth 
or other sources. For example, they know ( )βα , , the degrees where both employers and 
employees agreed on a binding contract of the centralised bargaining benchmark. In that 
case, if these degrees were larger than the tipping frequencies, ( )** ,βα  both the employees 
and the employers would expect this customary behaviour and the contract would be self-
enforcing, hence a convention. This implies that both parties may have heard of some 
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matches where the players played differently, i.e. could not agree on the terms, or agreed on 
a decentralised contract. This number was, however, considered so small that the players 
expected this behaviour as rather unlikely.  
However, it is reasonable to think of a situation where the employer carries greater 
uncertainty as to what the employee expects. Should the employer demand the equal share as 
“usual”, or does the other party have information that inclines him to demand a higher share? 
Because it is impossible to know “all” the other matches made in the previous period, Young 
(1996, 1998a, 1998b) assumes players with a finite set of memory m. In this case the players 
may have different information, and may create different expectations to base their best 
responses. The memory m will consist of what information they have gathered in previous 
rounds. Young (1996) assumes that the players may have limited recollection of their 
memory in developing their best response functions. He argues that a convenient way to 
model the acquiring of information is to suppose that the agent draws a random sample from 
the last m encounters. The sample size s reflects the agent’s informational network and is an 
inherent property of the agent, not a result of an optimal search. Young calls this best reply 
to recent sample evidence. For instance, if m = 15 and s = 5, an employer has heard about 15 
matches in the previous rounds similar to her company. She then only uses five random 
matches in forming her expectations. If three of these five consisted of employees playing 
strategy {D}, she may regard her best-response to be strategy {D}, depending on the 
payoffs. However, these three cases may have been the only three in the memory-set of 15. 
This particular match may again reach a different employee with m = 10 and s = 3. Based on 
this he will develop his best response function etc.  
With this reasoning, a few matches that went wrong may alter the conventions completely, 
and the strategies may diffuse in a population in considerably short time. With stochastic 
shocks, may a convention be regarded as a stable equilibrium? It will all depend on the 
probability of a person making a “mistake” in the game. In the above example, for the 
employer to switch best-response play, it needed three mistakes in previous rounds. If the 
probability of playing wrong is ε, and three independent individuals make this decision, the 
probability of tipping the employer from a specific best response to the other will be ε3. As 
Young (1996) states: “if two societies start off under similar initial conditions, there is a 
positive probability that at any given future time they will be operating different 
conventions. Such a process is said to be path dependent.” Further we introduce a simplified 
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model of the contract selection theorem described in Young (1998a), as explained in the 
 case in Bowles (2007), where m = s = 1.  22×
5.2.1 Reduced resistance 
The two pure equilibria are both likely to occur as conventions in a society. However, at 
which convention will the society spend most of time? Bowles (2007) assumes that the 
convention is stochastically stable if it is the most likely to occur, as the probability of 
“mistakes” decreases. To determine the most probable path from one convention to the 
other, Young (1998a) defines the term reduced resistance, given by equation (5.8).  
(5.8)     
ji
i
ji
i
ij bb
b
aa
ar +∧+=   
^ refers to minimum of the equations, so, rij is defined as the minimal number needed, in a 
population adhering to the convention i that idiosyncratically switch to strategy j, for 
inducing their best responding partners to switch theirs. Equation (5.8) rewritten becomes: 
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Because a convention may switch in two ways, either by the employees or employers 
playing idiosyncratic, the reduced resistances tells us in which way the most likely path of 
conventions will take. Hence, rDC shows how many players have to switch to induce from 
the decentralised {D} convention to the centralised {C} convention. Since   are the 
tipping frequencies, at least as many players as these numbers will have to play 
idiosyncratic. The same holds for rCD in the other direction.  
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Equations (5.10) show that moving from convention {D} to convention {C} at least  
of idiosyncratic play by the employees is required; while in the other direction 1  
of idiosyncratic play by the employers is required. For a centralised wage-system to be a 
stochastically stable convention, the number of idiosyncratic decisions needed to switch 
from convention {C} to convention {D} must be larger than the number needed to switch 
the other way. In other words, convention {C} must be persistent and convention {D} must 
be more accessible than {C}. That is: 
*αα >
*1 β−>β−
(5.11)     
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Equation (5.11) says that the total payoff in the equal convention must be bigger than the 
total payoffs in the unequal convention, for {C} to be stochastically stable. This suggests 
that the conventions chosen in a path are always pareto-superior to the others.   
The above discussion implies that the employers in a centralised bargaining will “save” 
more than the potential loss for the employee. However, it is crucial that both know, at least 
to some extent, that it is in fact possible to switch; i.e. they know the different payoffs w(p), 
W(p), π(p) and Π(p). One may argue that these measures are to some extent describing the 
race of technology vs. labour productivity. Following the reasoning presented in section 
2.4.2 as new technology emerges and proliferates, the employers need skilled labour and the 
demand for such labour will be greater than the supply. The result is more negotiation power 
for most productive employees, thus, demanding a larger piece of the pie. A common 
justification for this is that more productive people have usually invested more in education 
and experience, needing more pay as a result. However, as more people get educated,  
supply will equal demand for productive labour and the labour share for the productive 
employees will decrease. This can be thought of as an increase in average productivity in 
equations (5.1) and (5.3). Here, we assume that the productive employer will save profits, 
hence, that the society experiences floating technology-peaks, and a rather rigid labour-
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education. The movements of the payoffs according to technology-shifts may explain why 
the different contracts came to be in the first place.  
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6. Discussions 
6.1 Implementation of centralised system in the Nordic 
countries (i)  
Swenson’s (1991a) explanation that the centralised model of wage-negotiations rose from 
the economic depression in the Nordic countries, as described in section 2.5, is popular 
among labour economists. Because of low demand for different products, especially in the 
export sector, the employees had to moderate their wage demands for the company to 
survive in a difficult environment. For the workers to tolerate a wage-moderation, the 
unions’ bargained with other unions providing incentive to moderate their wages. In other 
words, the bargaining power of productive employees was diminished. This can be 
interpreted as a relative decrease in w(p). The opportunity cost carried by productive 
employees in a centralised system became relatively small, altering the best-response 
functions in line with equation (5.11). (5.11) explains that this reduction resulted in a larger 
(1-β*), eventually larger than α*, and the best-response institution switched to a centralised 
wage bargaining system. However, this requires that the relative profits were not altered at a 
similar degree.  
Introducing the labour disputes factor δ gives another explanation. Consider the game 
depicted in Figure 5.1. Modify the payoffs of coordination on strategies {D, D} from (w(p), 
π(p)) to the fall-back positions used by Barth and Moene (2008), given by (δw(p), δπ(p)). 
δ<1 represents a loss due to potential disputes in case of a breakdown in negotiations. 
Equation (6.1) shows that the level of δ may be important in determining the most efficient 
contract, hence, making the centralised system more stochastically stable.   
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Equations 5.1 and 5.3 show that more labour disputes, a smaller δ, result in greater W(p) and 
Π(p), while the alternative contract of the decentralised system becomes smaller. Moene and 
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Wallerstein (2006) described that the Nordic countries experienced the highest level of 
industrial conflict in the world in the years after the depression. This would be represented 
by a very small δ. In other words, the breakdown of negotiations in the years after the 
economic recession made the convention of centralised wage-bargaining more efficient and 
the players were induced to switch best-responses.   
6.2 Impact of labour migration  
The recent development of free trade and services between countries, to include free labour 
movement, may diminish obstacles for productive employees to search for jobs outside the 
countries’ borders. By introducing a simple modification to the expected payoffs of the 
different players, we can show that increased migration may add pressure on the stable 
centralised convention.  First, assume that the wage obtained in a decentralised system, w(p,) 
measures the opportunity cost carried by a productive employee in a centralised system. 
Further, assume this wage to be equal to the wage that equally productive employees in 
nearby countries with decentralised systems make. Let )1,0(∈m  measure the obstacles 
facing the migrant. That is, the higher the level of m, the easier is it to access jobs in foreign 
countries, i.e. fewer formal and informal problems like languages and culture barriers etc. 
Let the expected payoffs of the above average employees become 
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With no migration, setting , equation (6.2) becomes similar to (5.4). The easier it is to 
access jobs in a foreign country, the higher the expected payoffs will be for a productive 
employee. That is, if m=1, the productive employee is guaranteed a wage w(p) taking on 
work in foreign borders. (5.6) can then be re-written to  
0=m
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Equation (6.3) implies increased pressure on employers, that is, for the convention in 
preferable centralised wage-bargaining, fewer non-best responses are tolerated by the 
employers. Remember, at least as many as β of the employers need to play the conventional 
benchmark of centralisation. In Figure 5.2, this is shown by a vertical shift in the β*.  
Letting the employer differentiate between foreign employees and domestic employees, the 
company can offer a higher, competitive wage to foreigners equal to w(p). It is reasonable to 
think that the employer would only hire foreign employees if they had better skills and 
higher productivity. With two candidates for the job, one foreign and one domestic with 
similar skills, the employer would choose the domestic if this employee is guarded by the 
convention of centralised wages.  
However, on the other side of the productivity distribution, migrant workers with low skills 
will put immense pressure on the less productive employees. It has been assumed that these 
workers benefit from the centralised wages, earning more than their marginal productivity. 
With increased supply of low skilled workers, it should be intimidating for the employers to 
hire this labour for lower wages than the centralised benchmark. Similar to equations (6.2) 
and (6.3) the expected payoffs and tipping frequency become 
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The payoffs of the game in this setting are totally opposite, so that the employers prefer 
decentralised wage-setting. The switch of convention is now induced by lower productive 
employees playing non-best responses, that is, the higher α*, fewer idiosyncratic play by 
these employees would induce all the low-productive employers to play decentralised. If 
labourers are fully mobile and able to work wherever there is demand, , then no 
employers would offer higher wages than the decentralised wage for the less skilled workers.  
1=m
Note that in both these settings, the switch of systems is induced by the players that will lose 
from the consequences of the switch. However, if the benefits are as great as assumed, it is 
perhaps more plausible that coordination exists between the players, and that they will stick 
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to the preferred norm. This coordination can consist of plain cooperation and threat of 
sanctions put on deviators and lobbying against eventual threats. An example of the latter 
can be the effort made by the Labour Unions’ Confederation in Norway against so-called 
“social dumping”.   
6.3 Summary and conclusion 
So far I have tried to explain that the major reason why the most productive employees 
voluntarily participate and accept the wages set by a centralised bargaining is their best 
response strategy. I claim this to be the most important reason, rather than that societies with 
centralised wage scheme possess a population with a high degree of other regarding 
preferences. This is shown by considering the wages based on expectations and social 
norms. Presented as an evolutionary change of conventions a society may develop different 
institutions. The crucial understanding is the payoffs of the different parties involved, as they 
alter the tipping frequencies.  
Can the Nordic model be used as a development model for developing countries today? I 
have shown that the implementation in the Nordic countries may have been the most 
efficient path. Here, the willingness of the parties is important. There may have been 
underlying circumstances that triggered the Nordic societies to implement such a system. 
Without further discussions, due to limited space, I agree with Moene and Wallerstein that 
the compression of wages will benefit the employers of the productive sectors, moving 
labour and capital in the direction of more creative destruction. As the economic 
environment changes, the societies may switch conventions if this is more efficient. 
Increased information of international wages may increase the assumed opportunity costs 
carried by the productive employees. In addition, migration plays an important part. The 
easier it is to move to another country with higher wages, the greater the pressure on the 
centralised system. Many developing countries suffer from brain-flow, that is, the educated 
and most productive employees move across the borders, often to industrial countries, in 
search of higher wages. The employers of technology industries have little incentive to 
emphasise centralised bargaining schemes. The importance of attracting the most productive 
employees to avoid brain-flow is probably a much stronger incentive. Hence, a coercion of 
this system could induce more trouble for developing countries.  
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The model presented suggests that a switch of conventions in the Nordic countries come 
from random “mistakes” made by the employers of productive technologies. This may 
happen if productive employees’ opportunity costs are increased. Due to skill biased 
technology change found in more decentralised countries, opportunity costs become greater. 
The pressure on employers making less idiosyncratic play becomes severe. The employers 
would eventually lose from a potential switch. Therefore one may reasonably argue that the 
employers could somehow coordinate their actions, within an employers’ confederation, or 
impose punitive actions on employers deviating from the conventional play. If the employers 
do manage to coordinate, the model predicts that the conventions will never flip. The only 
possible way for this to happen is that the productive employees intentionally play non-best. 
To investigate the productive employees’ possibility of inducing this switch, more models 
need to be presented. The next chapter will try to explain how productive employees may 
dislodge the conventional play of employers; intentionally and by using collective action. It 
shows that even if the Nordic countries implemented the centralised system to increase 
efficiency, the system may persist if the most satisfied party is able to coordinate play.   
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7.   Intentional nonbest-responses 
The long-term relationships between employers in the Scandinavian countries described in 
section 2.5, implies a thorough coordination among employers. Regarding the outcome of 
the employers’ negotiations as given, whatever their play is, one can reasonably argue that 
no employer will play non-best by chance. In other words, if the employers have decided to 
always play the benchmark convention, for the employees to alter a convention, a substantial 
amount of idiosyncratic non-best response play is needed.  
In the model of intentional non-best responses, developed by Bowles and Naidu (2008), the 
dynamic institutional transitions are induced only by the idiosyncratic play of those who will 
benefit if a transaction will occur. In Microeconomics (2007), Bowles describes two 
important features of the players that need to be reconsidered. First, if productive employees 
succeeded in altering the convention towards a decentralised system, they will understand 
the impact this has on the least productive employees. In other words, an alternation of the 
system by more than the tipping-frequency of non-best responses are triggered by the 
productive employees’ understanding of actuarial fairness being more important than 
solidarity. Second, the reduced resistances introduced in equation (5.8) to (5.10) needs to be 
modified so that the only possible way of transiting conventions is by those who will gain. 
The next paragraph will treat this subject as in Bowles and Naidu (2008). The model 
describes how difficult it is for the productive employees if they are: i) non-organised with 
no communication of collective action with each other; or ii) organised in different industry 
unions, with obstacles of raising wage-demands due to conflicts of interests within the 
union, presented in section 2.2 to 2.4; or iii) organised as craft unions with no 
communication of collective action between the craft unions.   
7.1 Modified Reduced Resistances 
There are two important extensions to the previous model. First, the actions taken are now 
only from the productive employees that gain from a switch to decentralisation (on the other 
side of the productivity distribution, the employers would induce the switch). Second, the 
number of players, that is, the number of total employees and employers are important to 
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induce a switch. So far the model has treated matches to be random, drawn from two 
populations of equal size. When idiosyncratic play is intentional and not stochastic, the 
amount of non-best responses by the displeased group are largely influenced by the size of 
this group. It will be shown that if productive employees are organised by craft unions the 
number of subpopulations in the contract-setting will diminish, and the likelihood of 
switching conventions become much greater.  
Consider the contract setting between productive employees and employers. Let the total 
number of players be N. The total number of employers is (1-γ)N, while the total number of 
employees are γN. The new modified reduced resistances, similar to (5.9) become:  
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The new modified resistances show that equal to, or more than the tipping-frequency of 
employers need to play centralised to induce a switch of the employees’ best response; or the 
number of employees needed to play decentralised for the employers to alter their best 
response. (7.1) can be normalised by N without losing generality. The resistances refer to 
fractions of the two groups, rather than the actual number.  
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The reduced resistances refer to the number of players needed to play idiosyncratically for 
the other group of players to switch their best responses. Equation (7.2) show an important 
feature, namely, that the more employees relative to the employers, the larger will RCD 
become and subsequently more difficult to induce a transition towards a better outcome. In a 
scenario where most of the productive employees were organised in different craft unions, 
they would all be counted as voices of the unions’ demands. This implies fewer negotiators, 
only the representatives of the unions, and a relatively small γ. However, if they were either 
non-organised or organised in an industry union, since they cannot cooperate, this would 
imply a large γ.  
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7.2 How will the players be selected for actions towards 
non-best responses?  
Consider γ to represent the share of employees in the contract setting by craft unions’ 
representatives. One has to regard the representatives to speak for every member, raising 
wage demands on the belief that all the members support them. Let ε be the probability that 
the craft union is drawn, that means, all members will play non-best response. The 
probability, μi of a transition in any given period is then given by equation (7.3). 
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The first equation of (7.3) has to be interpreted as follows: To induce employers to switch 
their best response to a decentralised system, at least j craft unions need to break contracts 
with the employers. The probability of j unions in a given period taking action is given by εj. 
The term within the brackets shows the different combinations of how j unions can be 
sorted. Then after calculating the probability of j unions occurring, redo the calculations with 
j+1 unions. The sum of all these calculations will show the overall probability of inducing a 
transition to a decentralised system. The latter of the equations in (7.3) show the other 
direction for a transition from a decentralised towards a centralised system from actions by 
the productive employers.  
It is clear from equations (7.1) to (7.3) that the larger the population size of the employees 
and employers respectively, the less likely the groups are to induce a switch of convention in 
the preferred way. In the scenario described above, it is reasonable to believe that the 
number of employers and craft unions are somewhat equally shared; however, if this 
scenario is relaxed and the employees are either non-organised or organised in industry 
unions, γ will represent individuals rather than crafts. In the latter scenario, one should 
regard γ to be substantially larger. Remember that (1-α*)>½; a large γ and a large  
bring about severe difficulties for productive employees to switch conventions by non-best 
responses.  
NRj 01≥
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One might easily apply this model to a different situation. Imagine a society with a 
decentralised wage system. Here, the more dissatisfied groups are the less productive 
employees and the employers demanding productive labour. If unionisation is rare, the 
employees’ obstacles to alter conventions become so great that the persistence of the 
conventions is long-lasting. This would be even stronger when including migration into the 
equation. First, immigrants usually fill the jobs requiring little skills. Second, immigrants are 
rarely unionised. A flow of unskilled labour makes the less productive employers benefit 
more from the decentralised system, and at the same time increasing γ. Here, the relative 
strength of employers towards each other is important.     
7.3 The collective action problem 
This chapter investigates the possibility of coordination between employees to alter a present 
convention towards a more preferred one, utilising collective action. The actual action can 
be strike, a silent clause, or any other behaviour that capture a non-best response by the 
employees.   
The theory can be used to describe a range of social phenomena, such as why people 
participate in revolutions and revolt, voting in a democratic election, and organising of trade 
unions as a voice towards employers. This thesis treats the collective action problem of 
members in a specific trade union coordinating their actions towards the employers. 
Consider the model of the non-best response in the previous section. Regard the number of 
involved subgroups, γ, as different trade unions consisting of members of the upper half of 
the productivity distribution. If a certain share of the trade unions demands decentralisation, 
the model predicts that the conventions will flip employers’ best responses. How a specific 
trade union decides on non-best response is considered by the collective action problem. If 
the share of the members that participates in the collective action reaches a certain level, the 
trade union will represent their claim towards the employers and the centralised unions’ 
association.  
The next section is a brief description of the theory of collective action. The second section 
depicts a simplistic model suitable to describe the behaviour of the members of a trade union 
in pursuit of a decentralised wage-bargaining system.   
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7.3.1 The free-rider problem- no-one participates in the collective 
action 
What is important for people to be able to organize in coordinated behaviour towards other 
groups? When, and maybe equally important, why, do people participate in collective 
action? The collective action problem occurs when two or more people need to coordinate 
on an action that is not a shared best response for the players. As an example, consider “the 
tragedy of the fishers” introduced by Hardin (1968, quoted in Gibbons, 1992). Can the 
fishers coordinate on behaviour that is pareto- superior to the strategy that wipes out the fish 
from the lake? In a book called “The Logic of Collective Action” from 1965, Olson (quoted 
in Miller, 1992) a situation where no-one would participate in collective action is described. 
“Olson considers only self-regarding individuals lacking any social or community bond. 
Given the assumption of isolated, self-interested economic persons, Olson asks what 
conditions are necessary for such persons to act collectively (Miller, 1992).”  
The situation can be described as a public goods game, similar to an n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma game. An act by a single individual provides everyone with a public benefit and at 
the same time induces a cost of acting to the particular individual. In the case of the fishers, 
fishing less would impose a positive marginal good for oneself and everyone else and the 
specific fisherman would receive the cost of less income. “Because an individual has a 
negligible impact on large-scale collective actions, and because the benefits obtained in such 
actions are public and cannot be withheld from those who do not participate, Olson argues, 
the rational individual will not participate in collective action. The strategically rationally 
individual will be a free-rider” (Miller, 1992).  
Figure 7.1depicts the utilities of people participating in collective actions as a function of 
the share of co-operators. The figure illustrates a simple case, where each co-operator brings 
equal benefit to the public, that is marginal benefits and costs are constant. The upper curve 
is utility of free-riders. The dotted line shows the average benefit to all members- 
cooperators and non-co-operators.   
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Payoffs 
Utility of non-co-operator 
Utility of co-operator 
0 n 
Figure 7.1 (taken from Schelling, 1973, quoted in Elster 1985) 
In this scenario the free-rider will reap all the benefits imposed by the ones acting for public 
good, without paying the cost. Similar to a two-player prisoner’s dilemma, the best response 
of everyone is not to coordinate, so the Nash equilibrium is that everyone fink, hence, no-
one participates in the collective action. Obviously, this theory has obviously been criticized 
for lack of social realism. People do vote in elections, they do start revolutions and they do 
strike if terms of wage-contracts are largely dissatisfying.  
7.3.2 Benefits and costs of collective action 
Recently Norwegian newspapers have reported conflicts within the Norwegian police 
department. In the aftermath of a wage-fight between the police and the officials, or wage-
regulators, the media portrays a silent clause within the police force (Dagsavisen April 17th, 
2009, Aftenposten April 17th, 2009). The officers refuse to work any overtime in addition to 
a suspiciously large share of sickness leave within the force. However, the ones that do 
voluntarily work overtime “are being bullied by colleagues (Dagsavisen 17.april, 2009)”. 
The bullying are reported as post-its representing “yellow cards”, e-mails containing explicit 
warnings of unpleasant working-community and some officers claim they are being called 
“Judas”. The social sanctions towards the ones crossing the picket line can be labelled as 
costs towards the ones not participating in the silent clause. The over-time workers are 
subjected as disloyal to the collective action and are being punished for their free-riding. 
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However, it may be other reasons than free-riding that prevents some officers to participate. 
Still, they are being treated as free-riders by their colleagues.  
The actions of not working overtime impose a cost of lesser earnings, and since this is 
reported in the news, the public may feel disgust by how police-officers act towards their 
mates. This again can be labelled a social cost on the ones taking part in the “strike”. They 
may even feel guilt, shame or other internal, negative emotions towards the actions taken, 
both the punishing of colleagues and the actions of silent clause itself. However, there are 
also benefits associated to the action. There is a direct gain of “winning” the fight and 
reaching a better agreement, the more people participating; the greater the average utility.  
However, there exists possibly a positive utility in the process of agency. This may be the 
feeling of belonging to something important, bonding with others, and perhaps the 
satisfaction of contributing. Elisabeth Wood argues that such affective benefits received 
through participation, together with moral, are described as the most relevant explanation of 
the reason why civilian supporters chose to contribute in insurgency towards the government 
in El Salvador. She terms this “pleasure of agency” (Bowles, 2007).  
Elster (1985) describes implications for morality as a motivation for cooperation. He 
explains that if an individual asks the question, “But what if everyone did that?” the 
relevance of duty to collective action is captured. Further he argues that another 
interpersonal magic is that a person would be willing to represent her group, as the group 
would represent her. Another feature of preferences is altruism.  An altruist is an individual 
that receives pleasure from other people’s pleasure. The altruist may act for a public good 
even with no obligation. In a review of collective action theory and experiments, Ellinor 
Ostrom (2000), argues that players of a population are of different types and use norms in 
different ways. The types she addresses are: purely rational agents, reciprocal types, willing 
punishers, conditional co-operators (punish if others do) and free-riders. Elster (1985 pp. 
152) assumes that individuals in a population have “varying degrees of altruism, as well as 
selfish agents, as well as moral agents etc” and describes the snowball effect when “each 
new cooperator brings successively larger increases in the average benefit.” If some 
unconditional, highly altruistic and moral agents set off a collective action, less motivated 
people may join in when the share of cooperators becomes larger. Finally, even the selfish 
may benefit from joining. This need not be sequential, as rational individuals anticipate and 
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estimate other people’s actions, while full information agents can act separately towards 
non-best response.  
7.3.3 A model of Collective Action 
To capture all the costs associated to strikers and non-strikers within a group, Bowles (2007) 
develops a simple model where the group as a whole imposes a cost of non-conformism. 
Consider a specific trade union consisting of individuals with job-positions according to 
their productivity p. If the union acts militantly towards the employer, they are exposed to a 
cost, c. In other words, if the convention is to conform to the centralised wage-system, c 
exhibits a cost of non-conformism. To incorporate the free-rider problem, total non-
conformist costs are dependent on the number of strikers, s. That is, the more strikers, the 
less are the costs of striking. (Conversely, the more strikers the larger are the costs 
associated with non-conformist non-strikers.)  
The affective subjective costs and benefits, not related to share of strikers are measured by a 
parameter, μ. This parameter shows the emotional costs of striking, not by breaking the 
norm, but rather other internal feelings, such as conscience, immorality and altruism towards 
the less productive employees. μ also includes the net positive benefits or pleasure of agency 
subject of moral, duty and group-oriented altruism.     
Consider the union-members being able to anticipate and estimate the number of strikers 
within the group and, hence, their net costs and benefits. “Successful collective action often 
requires the ability to wait- to delay rather than to seize on any occasion to act” (Elster, 
1985). All members receive w(p) in subsequent periods if the strike is successful, and if the 
strike is not successful they continue to receive the centralised wage of W(p). “Thus, the 
relevant comparison is between the single-period net benefits to striking and abstaining” 
(Bowles 2007).    
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The top equation of (7.4) shows the positive direct benefits of a successful strike less the 
non-conformist cost decreasing in the total number of strikers. The bottom equation of (7.4) 
 51
shows the single-period utility of the non-striker. The costs of the non-striker increase in the 
numbers of strikers captured by social sanctions to avoid the free-rider problem.  
shows the payoffs as functions of strikers, similar to 
Figure 7.2
Figure 7.1.  
 
Payoffs 
μ(w(p)-W(p)) 
W(p) 
s* 
μ(w(p)-W(p))-c 
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μ(w(p)-W(p))-c 
W(p)-c 
Figure 7.2 From Bowles (2007, pp. 428 
The number s* reflects the tipping frequency. If one believes that the share of participators is 
greater than this number, the best response for the individual is to strike. For simplicity, if a 
member of the trade union believes that the probability that other group-members strike is 
0.5, then if s*< 1/2 all members would strike. s* is given by equation (7.5). 
(7.5)     
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It is straightforward to see that if )())()(( pWpWpw >−μ , then s* will be less than 1/2. That 
is, the direct benefits of striking exceed the payoffs accompanied by the centralised 
bargaining system. In other words, a potential strike depends on the opportunity cost carried 
by the productive employees, and the pleasure of agency-parameter μ. As an example, 
consider the net affective costs and benefits to equal zero, that is, no-one bothers to strike 
even if the potential decentralised wage is vastly greater than the centralised. In this case s* 
will be between ½ and 1. Now, consider μ=1, equation (7.5) shows that the potential wage 
of a decentralised system need to be twice as high as the wage currently received in 
centralised wage-bargaining for s* to be less than one half.  
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Elster (1985) describes altruism as an important factor to set collective action in motion. In 
the trade-union model, two kinds of altruisms are apparent. Since the individual knows the 
consequences of her actions, an act towards a more differentiated society implies that the 
striking individual has a notion of actuarial fairness. In other words, the union member 
knows that other people may become worse off as a consequence of her action. This can be 
termed as low degree of between-group altruism. In contrast, a strong level of within-group 
altruism would induce people to participate in the collective action. In equation (7.5), these 
two types of altruism would be reflected in μ.  
Similar arguments hold for societal inequality-aversion reflected in the centralised 
bargaining measure of equality, r. Reasonably, one may argue that social sanctions from 
other unions, media and other potential punishers are greater the larger r is, which implies 
that c is an increasing function of r. Differentiating equation (7.5) with respect to r then 
gives two opposing effects on s*. First, a greater r implies a larger gap between decentralised 
wage and the centralised, resulting in greater direct benefits of successful striking. This has a 
negative impact on s*. However, larger r induces a greater c, which decelerates the process.  
Consider the opposite process of lower r in the centralised bargaining system. That is, the 
specific unions are given more bargaining power in the productivity they represent. The 
effect would be that the centralised wage of the most productive employees would approach 
the decentralised. This implies that s* advance. Hence, a decentralisation of the system may 
be triggered within the centralised system, in that unions’ association provides different 
unions with power with reference to actuarial fairness to productivity. This raises two 
implications. First, if decentralisation of the system is done within this notion, then strikes 
can be made extinct. Second, if decentralisation is a function of r within this model, then 
may the decentralisation be reversible? That is, if the surrounding circumstances, economic 
and business cycles, international environment etc alter the domestic economic situation, the 
centralised bargainers exercise power favouring egalitarian preferences, which in turn will 
compress wages. Stokke and Seip (2003) argue that increased differentiation of wages, 
individual and geographical, within the Nordic countries is basically because “labour unions 
actively contribute to decentralised wage”. They assume that the reason for this is the 
“change in sense of justice”. Since membership of unions is unaltered, this may seem as a 
plausible explanation.     
 53
8. Discussions 
8.1 Implementation of centralised system in the Nordic 
countries (ii) 
Similar to the stochastic case described in equations (5.11), if RCD>RDC, then most of the 
time will be spent on the centralised convention. In other words, it requires more 
idiosyncratic play by the employees towards a decentralised wage-system, than it does by 
employers towards a centralised wage-system. Notice, that if γ = ½, then the modified 
reduced resistances will be similar to the stochastic case of equations (5.11). This suggests 
that there exist a γ* so that if γ> γ*, then a centralised system will be the convention, that is 
RCD>RDC. In other words, most employees are expected to play centralised, if the number of 
employees (or craft unions) is greater than γ*. γ* is found by setting RCD = RDC.   
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By implementing the payoffs in α* and β* into equation (8.1) the equation becomes 
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Letting 0=δ  implies . Equation (8.2) shows that when labour disputes are high very 
few idiosyncratic plays are needed from the employers. That is, as (1- γ*) becomes less than 
(1- γ), RDC becomes smaller than RCD. In the Nordic countries, the employers were well 
organised according to Peter Swenson (1991a and 1991b). After the depression, the Nordic 
countries experienced a substantial degree of labour disputes, and according to Moene and 
Wallerstein (2006), there were more lockouts by employers, than strikes by employees.  
0* =γ
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8.2 Persistence of the centralised system 
In the years after the great depression and up to this day, technology has been rapidly 
advancing. In trying to capture the increased benefits for the employers demanding highly 
skilled workers, consider an increase in productivity p, holding average productivity 
constant. This is a somewhat simplistic assumption; however, it shows the effect of higher 
demand for productivity relative to lower productivity. By taking the derivative of γ* with 
respect to productivity gives 
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The sign of the derivative come from , for the circumstance of 
productive employees and employers respectively. Equation (8.3) has to be interpreted as 
follows. As the demand for skilled labour increases, the employers benefits increase, which 
implies that the payoff matrix is altered such that it requires more employees to play 
idiosyncratic in the same period to induce a change of best-response functions of employers. 
In other words, as α* decrease with increased productivity of the employees, (1- α*) increase. 
That is, the share of employees needed to play {D} to alter the convention. Thus, even 
though the centralised system may have been implemented for efficiency reasons, it may 
persist because the employees cannot act cooperatively. As technology advances, and labour 
skills lags after, the system persists as γ* decrease with benefits of the productive employers. 
It is worth to notice that education in the Nordic countries are free of charge for everyone, in 
addition to generous welfare mechanisms towards students in the aim that everyone has 
opportunity to attend university. If education was costly, there is reason to believe that 
scholars would demand higher wages and be more militant towards employers. However, 
militancy requires that the different productive crafts are somewhat separately organised.  
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8.3 Reversible Decentralisation 
Stokke and Seip (2003) present a process of decentralisation in the Nordic countries in 
recent decades. This decentralisation has been greatest in Sweden. Swenson (1991b) 
describes a trade union- influenced decentralisation in Sweden in the 1980s. Swenson argues 
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that this was due to internationally induced inflation. The exporting sector, guided by the 
trade union “Metall”, was dissatisfied by the increased wage-level of the public sector and 
the additional inflation this brought upon the domestic economy. Letting the participants (γ) 
in equation (7.3) be weighted on the power of different unions, the presence of striking in 
only a single and powerful union increase probability of switch instantly. Thus, a collective 
action within the big unions may induce a switch of conventions according to equations (7.3) 
and (7.5). This argument is used by Nito (Norwegian Engineering- and Technology 
organization) in Norway. In a Fafo-report in 2006 by Seip on request by Nito, Seip writes: 
“An important factor to achieve independency [from centralised agreements] is to become 
“invincible”, to avoid being measured, weighted and compared with other groups. (...)If big 
groups manage to keep their wage-progress outside the equation [centralised system], the 
task becomes difficult.”   
In a Fafo-report by Stokke and Seip (2003), the authors argue that the current 
decentralisation of institutions the Nordic countries is basically powered by the trade-unions 
of more productive employees, for example Metall and Nito. However, they describe a 
process of both decentralisation and centralisation at the same time. The central level has 
greater control over setting the scope of agreements and giving warranties, while the 
distribution of wages is set at a local bargaining between employee and employer. They 
write: “The decentralisation is not being described as impossible to reverse. If wage-drift 
becomes out of control, the central level can impose a stricter direction. The development of 
wages is based on cycles, as in trends, claim participants of the Swedish tariff-agreements.”  
That trend of the wage-progress is assumed to be the driving force behind the 
decentralisation can be thought of variations of r from equations (5.1), (5.3). This implies 
that the unions representing the employees in current trend have a lesser degree of equality 
preferences. As r becomes smaller, the centralised wage becomes closer to the decentralised. 
This suggests that there is no need to alter conventions, as the payoffs grow to be similar. 
Within this reasoning, the different unions borrow the power, in according to their 
productivity, by the centralised bargainers. However, if anything happens to the economic 
environment, this power can be retaken and wages will again be distributed more egalitarian. 
How plausible this argument is, will not be discussed further. However, the report of Stokke 
and Seip (2003) finally concludes that locally negotiated wage is related to less worker 
struggle. This finding is consistent with equation (7.5). The lower r induces s* to advance 
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and decreases the likelihood of collective action. Instead of strike, the productive employees 
have been able to decrease the egalitarian distribution of wages by imposing local 
bargaining, which means that power in the negotiation is taken from the centralised 
agreements into the productivity of the employee respectively.  
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9. Concluding Remarks 
The game-theoretic approach used in this thesis is based on a few simplistic assumptions. 
Due to these assumptions, the reader should interpret the discussions in a general manner. It 
is important to highlight the assumption that employees with a similar productivity negotiate 
the wage-contract with a specific employer. The employer will for obvious reasons have no 
credible source of information of the specific productivity and will face adverse selection 
problems. However, through the matching process of hiring labour into a vacant position, the 
employer and the employee gather information about the other player through, often several, 
job interviews, reference-checks, CV etc. The main point will not be excluded, regarding 
that an exact match between a high-technological employer and a low-productive, 
uneducated, worker will not take place.  
This thesis concludes that the most productive labour do participate in the centralised wage-
bargaining voluntarily. This seems as a reasonable conclusion, considering the individual as 
adapting to the surrounding environment. The respective employee may feel: if there are no 
other jobs providing higher pay for my productivity or education, then I will have to stick 
with this.  
The thesis describes some dissatisfaction by unions consisting of members of typical highly 
productive crafts. These unions have the opportunity to alter the system by supporting their 
members’ non-best play. In the Nordic countries, the behaviour of such has resulted in 
decentralisation of the system. However, the potential collective action and worker struggle 
has been unravelled by the compromise of local bargaining in addition to the centralised.  
This thesis supports the logic that the compressed wages leads to a higher rate of creative 
destruction and can be used as a growth model. As technology advances, this feature is even 
stronger; however, this alters the opportunity costs, and hence enhances pressures of a 
potential flip of conventions. Since the behaviour of both employers and employees are 
subject of the surrounding environment, to raise the idea of compressed wages in current 
developing countries will probably not be supported by best responses of employers, due to 
the problem of brain-flow.    
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